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This article analyzes the effectiveness of transnational multi-stakeholder
partnerships for sustainable development—also known as “Type II out-
comes” of the 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development—in the
sustainable energy sector. We combine quantitative and qualitative
research. Quantitatively, we use a database of 340 partnerships, including
46 partnerships that focus on energy. Our qualitative analysis includes case
studies of ﬁve partnerships that appear as the most effective and ﬁve that are
operational but only with modest degrees of effectiveness. We study two
competing hypotheses. The ﬁrst, rooted in institutionalism, assumes that
variation in effectiveness is related to organizational structures and proce-
dures. The competing hypothesis emphasizes the power of actors and
expects partnerships that involve key business actors and powerful North-
ern states to perform better. We conclude that the level of institutionaliza-
tion is most important in explaining effectiveness, while powerful partners
and the type of internal organization may further enhance effectiveness.
Introduction
Transnational multi-stakeholder partnerships are often regarded as an
important institutional innovation to solve pressing problems of global
governance. These supposedly novel arrangements are characterized by
the involvement of both public (governmental) and private (business,
nongovernmental, and academic) parties, bringing in additional resources
and working toward a speciﬁc, initially deﬁned goal. For example, Börzel
and Risse (2005) argue that such partnerships may help overcome regula-
tory implementation and participation deﬁcits in global governance. This
argument for a new role for transnational multi-stakeholder partnerships
has been made most forcefully in the policy area of sustainable develop-
ment. At the 2002 World Summit for Sustainable Development in Johan-
nesburg, such partnerships were, in fact, the only tangible outcome of the
summit, often hailed as a new, “Type II” mode of global governance.
Streck (2002), for instance, suggests that the agenda and procedures of the
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United Nations Organization are too stagnant to cope with current global
problems. As a result of this vision of “new and innovative governance,”
more than 340 transnational multi-stakeholder partnerships have been
agreed around or after the Johannesburg summit and registered with the
United Nations Commission on Sustainable Development (CSD). Our
analysis focuses on this particular set of partnerships precisely because of
the high expectations and grand promises that have been voiced with their
launch. Methodologically, a focus on a deﬁned and limited set of transna-
tional public–private partnerships (as opposed to a larger but potentially
open-ended set) allows for speciﬁc, but more robust, conclusions (see
Biermann, Pattberg, et al. 2007).
Yet, the positive expectations voiced in Johannesburg are also con-
tested, and many authors caution for an overly optimistic view of multi-
stakeholder partnerships in the ﬁeld of sustainable development (Martens
2007; United Nations 2005). Whereas some observers see partnerships as
an important step in the development of global governance, others view
them rather as a “cover-up” for interstate power struggles and as indica-
tion of a privatization of international relations (Spaeth 2002). While pre-
vious assessments have highlighted that CSD-registered partnerships vary
not only in function, size, goals, and organizational structure (Andonova
and Levy 2003; Biermann, Chan, et al. 2007; Hale and Mauzerall 2004),
relatively little is known about why multi-stakeholder partnerships vary in
their effectiveness. Many partnerships seem to be ineffective and at times,
not even traceable in empirical research, while others are well known and
achieve the organizational goals that they have set for themselves. The key
question is, then, what explains differences in effectiveness between the
most effective and the least effective partnerships?
This article scrutinizes this question with regard to a subset of partner-
ships: transnational multi-stakeholder partnerships that focus on energy.
Out of the total set of around 340 CSD-registered partnerships, 46 are
dedicated to sustainable energy, which is primarily understood as the
provision of energy from renewable sources or the popularization of
means to economize the use of renewable energy. Most partnerships in
this area seek to contribute to sustainable development through knowl-
edge dissemination and technology transfer (33%), building of institu-
tional capacity and training (22%), technical implementation (17%),
knowledge production and innovation (13%), and some other planned
functions (15%). Only 8 of the 46 energy partnerships have been estab-
lished to create new energy infrastructure on the ground, while the
majority is engaged in disseminating information related to sustainable
energy.
This article both assesses the effectiveness of partnerships and possible
factors that may explain variation in the effectiveness. We assume that
variation can be explained either by the internal structure of partnerships,
especially the decision-making mechanisms and management structures
or by the character of actors involved. Our empirical restriction to the ﬁeld
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of energy policy controls for a number of variables that may explain
differences between policy ﬁelds and consequently allows us to focus on
the two sets of factors that we are studying.
Our article combines qualitative and quantitative methods of analysis,
thus attempting to move beyond the “case study fallacy” that character-
izes a large amount of recent research on partnerships. The results of both
types of analysis suggest that a high level of institutionalization is neces-
sary for a partnership to function, while a speciﬁc tripartite organizational
structure and the involvement of powerful actors can additionally
improve the effectiveness and scale of an initiative. Research shows,
however, that even these modest institutional features are often absent for
many of the CSD-registered multi-stakeholder energy partnerships. Our
article thus not only contributes to a better understanding of energy part-
nerships but also to a broader assessment of novel governance arrange-
ments beyond the state (for an overview, see Biermann and Pattberg 2008).
In the next section, we introduce the two competing hypotheses that
may explain variation in effectiveness of partnerships along with a brief
review of the broader academic literature in which these hypotheses are
rooted. We then discuss the methodology used in the qualitative and
quantitative analysis. Subsequently, we proceed with our empirical analy-
sis: We ﬁrst test assumptions derived from the competing hypotheses
against statistical data and then provide an in-depth analysis of 10 selected
partnerships. The ﬁnal section summarizes our ﬁndings and suggests
some avenues for future research.
Research Design and Hypotheses
Within the burgeoning ﬁeld of study related to multi-stakeholder partner-
ships, there are essentially two core hypotheses that are brought forward to
explain variation in the effectiveness of such initiatives. A ﬁrst hypothesis,
derived from international political economy and realist theories in inter-
national relations, points to the power of the actors involved as the main
explanatory variable. It posits that partnerships that involve powerful
business actors and major industrialized countries perform best. The rea-
soning behind this hypothesis is that considerable resources are needed to
inﬂuence the activities of the energy sector worldwide. On this theoretical
basis, one canhypothesize that themost powerful and inﬂuential stateswill
try to dominate speciﬁc partnerships to limit access of other actors. Part-
nerships can consequently be expected to appear in areas that are strongly
linked to private business. Hypotheses centering on power can also be
linked to neo-Gramscian theory (Brand 2002). On this account, we expect
powerful industrialized countries and major corporations to dominate
effective partnerships, thus exercising hegemony under the cover of devel-
opment aid and environmental initiatives (Arts 2003; Dimitrov 2003; Fuchs
2004; Goverde et al. 2000; Reinalda and Verbeek 2001).
EFFECTIVENESS OF TRANSNATIONAL ENERGY PARTNERSHIPS 715
A competing hypothesis, derived from institutionalist research tradi-
tions, posits that internal structures of partnerships inﬂuence their
effectiveness: In other words, partnership design matters. Variation in
effectiveness would then be related to the legal and institutional design as
well as the internal organizational structure of a partnership. This argu-
ment is related to a large body of literature on intergovernmental regimes
and the legalization of world politics (see, e.g., Abbott et al. 2000; Barrett
1999; Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidal 2001; Mitchell 1994). Consequently,
not the characteristics of the participants but the institutional arrange-
ments in place inﬂuence effectiveness. For example, we assume that
within an institutionalized and structured context of the partnership, a
more process-oriented, deliberative decision-making procedure, com-
bined with network-style governance, enhances effectiveness.
The testing of the relative value of these competing hypotheses requires
a concept to measure relative effectiveness of partnerships. Assessing the
effectiveness of partnerships is contested because the concept is often
underdeﬁned, weakly operationalized, and hard to measure (cf. Bernauer
1995). In the area of environmental governance in general, the impact of
institutional arrangements on environment quality indicators has to be
distinguished against the background noise of a large variety of other
factors. Young (2001, 100) emphasizes the need for large n studies and
medium n comparative approaches (e.g., qualitative comparative analysis).
Yet, while research on international regimes has made signiﬁcant progress
in its scope, moving from single cases to large n analysis of databases
(especially see Breitmeier, Young, and Zürn 2006), the more recent litera-
ture on transnational policy networks and partnerships is still dominated
by small n approaches (Vollmer 2009). Often, such studies bring interest-
ing insights, but even though they provide measurements of effectiveness,
they often fail to identify reasons for variation in inﬂuence (Mitchell 1994).
Our work combines large n research approaches—drawing on the Global
Sustainability Partnerships Database (GSPD)1 (Biermann, Chan, et al.
2007)—with an in-depth analysis of 10 carefully selected cases.
The effectiveness of transnational multi-stakeholder partnerships could
be measured at three levels: output, outcome, and impact (based on
Easton 1965). Impact would measure the actual improvement in the
problem area in the form of tangible changes in economic, social, or
environmental parameters. However, given that transnational multi-
stakeholder partnerships are a rather recent phenomenon, we expected
little observable effects in terms of outcome—that is, changes in behavior
of targeted communities—or even impacts—that is, positive changes of
target indicators such as reductions in energy consumption. Outcome and
impact are especially difﬁcult to measure when it comes to large n research
programs, such as our use of the GSPD, while it is more amendable to
in-depth case study research. For these reasons, our focus in assessing the
effectiveness of transnational multi-stakeholder partnerships is on their
output, that is, their actual activities such as issuing regulations, producing
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reports, conducting research, or organizing meetings. These core
functions are similar for a large number of partnerships. Many partner-
ships provide some funding to target groups; they provide training,
information, or technologies to address core areas of sustainable
development. Most of these functions have been operationalized and
empirically assessed in the GSPD to measure effectiveness in terms
of output. The amount of output is not only comparable among
partnerships but can also be measured in terms of variables such as the
amount of information published in a given period or dissemination in
terms of how much information has been downloaded from the partner-
ship Web site.
Output as a standard of measurement can also overcome a speciﬁc
problem of researching partnerships for sustainable development in the
United Nations context: A large number of them are likely to be
nonoperational—they stopped functioning, they never really started, or
for some reason they are inherently dysfunctional.
While output alone sufﬁces for a ﬁrst analysis, an in-depth study needs
to take into account in how far this output is related to speciﬁc functions.
Only if a partnership is active in a way necessary to fulﬁll its function can
it be ultimately effective. Within the GSPD, there are 12 types of output for
each partnership. These types are linked to speciﬁc functions. In order to
be able to (potentially) fulﬁll a function and thus (potentially) have some
effects on a given sector, the output of a partnership has to be in line with
its functions (the function of a partnership as used here is an abstraction of
the partnership goals as interpreted by the researchers of the GSPD; the
coding of functions for all the CSD-registered partnerships was based on
information provided to the CSD).
A partnership is seen as partly fulﬁlling a function if it has at least one
type of visible output related to it. Working toward fulﬁlling a function is,
however, not equivalent to making concrete progress against targets and
reaching the partnership goals initially set out. Within the context of this
research, we deﬁne the effectiveness of partnerships as the sum of all its
effects measured by observable output (see Biermann, Chan, et al. 2007).
Strictly speaking, our research assumes that observable output will even-
tually inﬂuence behavior (outcome) and change target indicators (impact);
in this sense, we are measuring the potential effectiveness of partnerships
rather than their real impact on sustainable development.
In testing these two conﬂicting hypotheses outlined earlier, we
employed two complementary methodologies. First, we studied all 46
energy partnerships registered with the CSD by analyzing the GSPD. The
database is continuously updated, and it contains information on approxi-
mately 340 partnerships. It accounts for a number of possible explanatory
factors such as actors (number, involvement of powerful states, etc.),
design (inclusiveness of membership rules, ﬂexibility, governance mecha-
nisms, task division, institutional features, etc.), leadership (type and
organizational leadership capacity), and problem type. We used descrip-
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tive statistics to show how certain variables and their combinations corre-
late with the effectiveness (measured in terms of observable output) of
energy partnerships.
Second, we conducted qualitative case studies of a sample of 10 part-
nerships in the energy sector, selecting the ﬁve most effective and the ﬁve
least effective from those partnerships that are operational. The studies
focus on different aspects of the partnership’s internal organization and
assess their impact on the effectiveness. Our research approach is compa-
rable to that of “nested analysis” proposed by Evan Lieberman (2005). On
the background of a large n statistical study, we chose a sample of cases
(divided according to the variation of the dependent variable they repre-
sented) and investigated them more closely. The sample selected for quali-
tative investigation thus covers 20% of the whole energy partnerships
population.
The group of ﬁve most effective partnerships has been selected based
on two variables used in the GSPD: aggregated output and an expert
survey that ranks partnerships in a number of functional areas, giving a
reliable general description of the partnership’s potential inﬂuence. The
expert survey was conducted within the framework of the GSPD and
measured, among others, how often and which partnerships were men-
tioned by experts as being relevant in their ﬁeld. This serves as a proxy for
the visibility and acknowledged activeness of a partnership in its area. The
ﬁve most effective partnerships according to these criteria are the Global
Gas Flaring Reduction Partnership, the Methane to Markets partnership,
the Renewable Energy and Energy Efﬁciency Partnership, the Renewable
Energy Policy Network for the 21st Century, and the International Solar
Energy Society. Considerable differences between these partnerships are
observable. The Renewable Energy and Energy Efﬁciency Partnership is
by far the largest with more than 250 organizational partners involved,
while the Global Gas Flaring Reduction Partnership has only 12 partners.
Other important differences, allowing for the observance of variation in
the explanatory variables are also present and will be discussed later.
The group of ﬁve least effective (but operational) partnerships in the
energy sectors includes theAfrican Energy Legacy Projects, the LPG Chal-
lenge partnership, the Paciﬁc Islands Energy for Sustainable Development
partnership, the U.S. Clean Energy Initiative, and the International Renew-
able Energy Alliance. Among these, two were completely unknown to the
experts surveyed, while the U.S. Clean Energy Initiative was mentioned 10
times.
Quantitative Analysis of Transnational Energy Partnerships
Nonoperational Partnerships
To start with, our analysis of the GSPD revealed that 21 of the 46 energy
partnerships are entirely inactive; that is, they do not generate any observ-
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able output. Five of these 21 partnerships were indeed launched but
stopped working after an agreed period. The remaining 16 nonoperational
partnerships have either not started yet or were never operational. Among
all the CSD partnerships, 37% do not generate any output, which suggests
that energy-related initiatives are more likely to be nonoperational. This is
an interesting observation given that the provision of renewable energy is
a very important policy goal that attracts much political attention. In the
remainder of this section, we try to answer why this dysfunctionality
occurs not only through looking at zero output initiatives but more impor-
tantly, by showing the common characteristics of most successful initia-
tives. What is the most important factor affecting variation in measurable
output? Is it the presence of important governmental and business actors
or rather partnership design and internal governance patterns?
Inﬂuence of Inclusion of Important Actors
According to the “powerful actors” hypothesis, the effectiveness of part-
nerships is related to the power and resources of important partners who
have an interest in the initiative’s activities. This should mean that effec-
tive partnerships (those with high output levels) are led by powerful states
or business actors, while ineffective initiatives should have many small
developing states or nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) as partners.
Our data show that states are indeed reluctant to give away control over
energy initiatives to private actors—two-thirds (30) of the partnerships in
this sector are led by states (16), intergovernmental organizations (8), or
United Nations agencies (6). However, having public actors as main part-
ners does not seem to necessarily improve the effectiveness of partner-
ships as about the same percentage of public-led partnerships are found to
be nonoperational as compared with those partnerships that are not led by
states or intergovernmental bodies (47%). Just under two-thirds of all CSD
partnerships are public led, and 44% of these have no signs of output.
Thus, energy partnerships are hardly different from the average. Only 16
energy partnerships are led by private organizations, in four cases, busi-
ness and in two cases, NGOs. This suggests that there is very little corre-
lation between the type of lead actor in a partnership and its effectiveness
measured in output.
Only 7 of the 16 state-led initiatives have output, suggesting that states
(no matter if they are powerful or not) are even less effective leaders than
international organizations. However, if we only look at the partnerships
with a high participation of member states of the Organisation for Eco-
nomic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (more than four OECD
states as partners), we receive a set of seven partnerships. Six of these have
visible output, and three belong to the ﬁve most effective partnerships
(Methane to Markets, Renewable Energy and Energy Efﬁciency Partner-
ship, and Renewable Energy Policy Network for the 21st Century). From
the state-led partnerships that have at least one European Union (EU)
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member as partner, all are fully operational. Only 15 of the total 330 CSD
partnerships meet the same criteria, and all show output. This ﬁnding is
very interesting and seems to be consistent with the “powerful actor”
hypothesis. The role of EU states may thus be an important factor. On the
other hand, partnerships with high OECD representation but no EU
involvement are largely ineffective. This could suggest that decision-
making culture and the speciﬁc deliberative decision-making style repre-
sented by the continental EU states have an inﬂuence on the overall
effectiveness of transnational multi-stakeholder partnerships.
A combination of powerful state and business partners is also very
common. One example is the Renewable Energy and Energy Efﬁciency
Partnership, which is one of the largest energy partnerships and one of the
largest CSD-registered partnerships. Some 72% of the energy partnerships
with both OECD and private for-proﬁt actors as partners generate output.
More than half of these (among them, four of the ﬁve best performing)
show at least six different types of activity, which according to our con-
ceptualization equals a very high potential effectiveness. This correlation
is even stronger for the overall sample of all CSD-registered partnerships,
where over 80% of partnerships with both OECD states and businesses
have some observable output (82% if an OECD state is also leading the
partnership).
These data indicate merely a positive correlation but not necessarily a
causal relation. However, if additionally, the partnerships’ internal struc-
ture is taken into account—that is, if we only look at the initiatives with
network-type steering (nonhierarchical)—we ﬁnd that 91% of partner-
ships meeting all these criteria are active. OECD and business involve-
ment plus network-type steering is perhaps a formula for success, but not
an explanation. Again, the conclusion can be that based on statistical
analysis, it is not possible to explain fully the difference in inﬂuence,
although the correlation observed is quite strong. However, the suggested
“formula” mixes variables from two realms—the one external to the part-
nership itself, composed of actors, and the internal structure.
Inﬂuence of Number of Actors
Following the hypothesis that the characteristics of the members of part-
nership matter, one could suggest that larger partnerships are more pow-
erful and should thus perform better. The energy partnerships with visible
output are highly diversiﬁed. Their size, measured by number of partners,
varies from 2 (Industrial Energy Efﬁciency Association) to over 250
(Renewable Energy and Energy Efﬁciency Partnership), giving an average
of 46 partners. This makes them, on average, much bigger initiatives than
the group of nonoperational partnerships, which have, on average, less
than 10 partners. This can suggest that active energy partnerships are more
effective because they are, on average, quite large. It is also likely that they
are larger because they attract more partners, and they attract more part-
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ners because they have visible output. They may also gain new partners
who bring in new resources and in turn, enhance output even further. The
primary reason for output is not the number of partners as every partner-
ship at some point had to start with only a handful of stakeholders.
Effective energy partnerships rather appear to simply gather more part-
ners (which can be interpreted as getting more attention) than effective
partnerships on average, supporting the claim that sustainable energy is
now an issue high on the political agenda. Only an analysis of concrete
cases in time showing the growth of speciﬁc partnerships could help in
directing the causal arrow one way or the other. That sort of analysis is
beyond the scope of large n methods alone but will be done in this article
at a later stage.
Inﬂuence of Internal Organization
Organizational structures can explain the effectiveness of partnerships
both at the most superﬁcial and at deeper levels. In particular, partner-
ships that are institutionalized in the form of a formal organization with
its own staff generate much more output than other partnerships. This
does not come as a surprise because it only means that people who are
paid to work for a given initiative are doing their job. However, the
ﬁnding gains practical signiﬁcance if one considers that only 10 of the 46
energy partnerships have at least one staff member.
Another relevant factor is also typical for organizations in the strict
sense—corporate identity, usually associated on the very minimal level
with having a “brand” name, an emblem and concentrating efforts under
corporate “colors.” Only 11 energy partnerships have a corporate identity
thus deﬁned, and 10 of them are effective.
Qualitative Analysis of Transnational Energy Partnerships
While quantitative data can provide an overview of the CSD-registered
partnerships in the energy sector and show general tendencies, there is a
need to look into the actual structures of partnerships in order to explain
variation in their effectiveness. Therefore, we have complemented our
analysis of the GSPD by 10 in-depth case studies of transnational multi-
stakeholder partnerships in the energy sector. The selection of the 10 cases
has been described earlier; we have studied the ﬁve most effective and the
ﬁve least effective energy partnerships that are operational. Five factors
appeared as relevant in our analysis: the level of institutionalization, the
type of function that partnerships are supposed to fulﬁll, the possibility of
a misﬁt of functions and output, the inﬂuence of internal organization, and
the speciﬁc institutional context and “nesting.” We will discuss each of
these explanatory factors in turn.
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Inﬂuence of Level of Institutionalization
First, it appears from our analysis that the level of institutionalization
makes a difference. To start with, the level of institutionalization2 of the
ﬁve least effective partnerships is very low. For example, the African
Energy Legacy Projects is a joint venture of energy producers rather than
an organization (SouthernAfrican Development Community 2009; South-
ern African Power Pool 2009). The “initiative” is led by the South African
company ESKOM (formerly the Electricity Supply Commission), but even
the single company’s employee directed to represent the African Energy
Legacy Projects is unreachable or does not work for ESKOM anymore
(CSD 2009). The LPG Challenge resembled a United Nations Develop-
ment Programme (UNDP) project rather than an actual formalized part-
nership. Its vagueness is made evident by the fact that the initiative has
two different names (also LP Gas Rural Energy Challenge) under which it
can be traced, diminishing its corporate identity. The Paciﬁc Islands
Energy for Sustainable Development is a program, undertaken to imple-
ment a policy document, realized by Paciﬁc Islands Applied Geoscience
Commission (SOPAC). The SOPAC (2009) Web site does not list Paciﬁc
Islands Energy for Sustainable Development at all. Additionally, the “part-
nership” has recently been subsumed under the larger Renewable Energy
and Energy Efﬁciency Partnership.
The ﬁrst major problem of ineffective partnerships is the lack of insti-
tutionalization in form of an independent organization. This results in the
unclear structure of most such partnerships. This does not mean that they
are grassroots arrangements. Usually, they are just proposed initiatives
that have never been fully made operational. Most of them are inactive, but
those that claim to be are also doing very little, perhaps because there is no
one to work in the name of a given partnership. Neither the actors’ power
nor the style of decision making can have any impact in that case.
However, the involvement of OECD and business actors can make a
difference by introducing good practices to the workings of such partner-
ships. One example is the Paciﬁc Islands Energy for Sustainable Develop-
ment newsletter that has been issued after the signing of a memorandum
of understanding with the Renewable Energy and Energy Efﬁciency Part-
nership (Paciﬁc Islands Energy for Sustainable Development Partnership
2007). Minimal institutionalization, self-reports, and a Web site—all these
can be achieved with small cost and effort.
Once a formal structure is established and a partnership becomes
operational, the style of decision making can also play a role. In that sense,
institutionalization is the basic factor leading to a partnership’s effective-
ness. All ﬁve highly effective partnerships are highly institutionalized,
usually in a typical form of international organizations with steering com-
mittees and secretariats (Dingwerth and Pattberg 2009).
Ineffective partnerships often also seem to be not institutionalized on
purpose as they often play a role of brands rather than actual organiza-
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tions. Two partnerships from the group of the least effective energy
partnerships—the U.S. Clean Energy Initiative and the International
Renewable Energy Alliance—are examples of such “brands” or “labels.”
Their role is to be an umbrella for other existing partnerships, organiza-
tions, and programs, but they themselves have neither staff nor actual
resources to perform any functions. The U.S. Clean Energy Initiative is
only a name given to a wide range of American-led programs and orga-
nizations. Although it brings together very powerful actors (U.S. Depart-
ment of State, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, U.S. Agency for
International Development, World Health Organization, Nations Depart-
ment of Economic and Social Affairs, the World Bank, UNDP), it has little
actual action capacities. Probably because it is only a “brand” sticker for
numerous other initiatives, it has a very high expert “mentioning” score in
our expert survey.
The International Renewable EnergyAlliance is a coalition of four actual
renewable energy organizations: the International Geothermal Associa-
tion, the International Hydropower Association, the International Solar
Energy Society, and the World Wind Energy Association (International
Renewable Energy Alliance 2009). They are all active and visible in the
energy sector, some for more than half a century (as for the International
Solar Energy Society), but the advocacy projects bearing the International
Renewable Energy Alliance brand are performed by individual member
organizations (International Solar Energy Society 2009). It is the only one
of the least effective operational partnerships with a Web site and a logo.
Nevertheless, it has no visible output of its own (GSPD 2008). The ques-
tion then is why such initiatives are established in the ﬁrst place? Why
create a partnership that is meant to do nothing concrete and has no
chance of success? To answer these questions, we must ﬁrst problematize
the concept of “success.” As Marianne Beisheim and Klaus Dingwerth
(2008, 6) point out, we ﬁrst need to ask: Success for whom? Success from the
perspective of founders or members at large is not necessary the same as
“objective” success from the perspective of the entire society or the envi-
ronment. Therefore, what may seem as unacceptable waste of resources
and attention—multiplying the number of dysfunctional sustainability
initiatives—can well be explained by publicity and “synergy” proﬁts for
the partners. It is deﬁnitely better to have a broad portfolio of partnerships
in various sectors than none or just a few, even if they are active. This
explains, to some extent, the alarming ratio of inactive and ineffective
partnerships in the CSD register.
Inﬂuence of Type of Function Partnerships Are Supposed to Fulﬁll
The group of highly effective and little effective partnerships varies sig-
niﬁcantly in terms of the functions they are meant to perform (as coded in
the GSPD, see Table 1).
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The most visible difference is the emphasis on participatory manage-
ment, technology transfer, and technical implementation among the less
effective partnerships in contrast with knowledge dissemination as one of
the key functions for highly effective ones. Insofar as the “laggards” do
not have any visible signs of output at all, it is not possible to see any
function–output ﬁt. What is to be noted, however, is that participatory
management and technical implementations are difﬁcult to achieve. None
of the ﬁve most effective energy partnerships manages to have any inﬂu-
ence in this area either. In other words, the third reason explaining inef-
fective partnerships’ failure is the choice of functions and goals that are
very difﬁcult to reach. This is not wrong in itself but may account for less
effectiveness. As Table 2 shows energy partnerships rarely take up the
more difﬁcult functions. Do the most effective partnerships perform that
well in contrast to the “laggards?” The analysis of the ﬁt between function
and output reveals a more complex relationship.
TABLE 1
Variables and Operationalization
Variable Operationalization
Involvement of
“powerful actors”
Three variables from the GSPD database have been
considered separately as well as together: involvement
of OECD states, EU states, and private business
Level of
institutionalization
Several elements are taken into account, such as own
staff, ofﬁce, signs of corporate identity such as logo
Steering Three types of steering are distinguished: hierarchical
steering, partial steering, and network-type steering
GSPD, Global Sustainability Partnerships Database; OECD, Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development; EU, European Union.
TABLE 2
Functions of Highly Effective and Little Effective Partnerships Compared
Function
Number of Partnerships Performing the Function
Five Most Effective
Energy Partnerships
Five Least Effective
among the Operational
Energy Partnerships
Knowledge dissemination 3 —
Technology transfer 3 4
Technical implementation 3 2
Participatory management — 3
Training 2 1
Planning 1 1
Norm setting 1 —
Lobbying 1 —
Capacity building — 1
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Fit between Function and Output
Output is not equivalent to problem-solving capacity but rather an indi-
cator for the potential success of a partnership. In order to be considered
successful in terms of making progress against certain predeﬁned targets,
a partnership is expected to be active in ways fulﬁlling its functions.
Having many types of output is not necessarily conducive to reaching
goals; it does add, however, to publicity. On the other hand, fewer types of
output concentrated only on function fulﬁllment can be interpreted as an
indicator for potential effectiveness. Output-generating partnerships vary
signiﬁcantly with regard to their function–output ﬁt. Some partnerships
have activities but related to a function that the partnership did not ini-
tially plan to perform, while others only produce few types of output but
focused precisely on the actual function to be fulﬁlled.
The Mediterranean Renewable Energy Program has only three types of
output, yet they act toward the fulﬁllment of two out of three of its
functions. An even better example is the “Energy for Poverty Eradication
and Sustainable Development” initiative, which has only one type of
output, but it is also (ideally) helping it in reaching its goals in two out of
three areas. Among the ﬁve most effective energy partnerships are only
two partnerships that fulﬁll all of its functions—Methane to Markets and
the Renewable Energy Policy Network for the 21st Century. However, the
remaining three “champions” are performing relatively well and act
toward two out of three functions (Table 3).
It is important to note that types of output are much diversiﬁed in the
efforts and resources needed to generate them. The participation in con-
ferences or the organization of a workshop is hardly related to infrastruc-
ture construction. Three of the ﬁve most effective energy partnerships
have “technical implementation” as their function, but none of them has
matching visible output. The African Energy Legacy Projects, one of the
“laggards,” was established to fulﬁll this function alone—and so far, it
fails. Should the African Energy Legacy Projects ﬁnally complete the con-
struction of at least one transmission line improving the Pan-African elec-
tric grid, it would reach a very important and measurable goal—perhaps
its actual impact would be much more important than all ﬁve most effec-
tive energy partnerships combined. However, the functions chosen by the
ﬁve most effective partnerships are usually much more modest. Three of
them aim at knowledge dissemination, three at technology transfer, two at
training, and the remaining functions are planning, lobbying, and norm
setting. All of these functions relate to information and “know-how”
dissemination.
Another relevant observation is the amount of excess output generated
because of activities not related to initially declared functions. If we
exclude the possibility that this “bonus” output is a result of theoretical
and methodological shortcomings (the explained subjectivity of function–
output ﬁt analysis, meaning that the so called “excess output” could in fact
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be perceived by the partnership itself as fulﬁlling its core functions), the
remaining conclusion is that active partnerships are putting effort and
resources into irrelevant activities. Irrelevant again from the perspective of
the general public in the sense that the partnership is not working toward
goals and impact but rather working just for the sake of it. For all ﬁve most
effective partnerships, at least half of the performed activities are not
meaningfully related to its functions. If we assume that such mode of
operation is using many resources, which could have been channeled
toward progress against important targets, it turns out that even the most
effective energy partnerships are quite inefﬁcient. This last criticism
should not divert our attention away from the fact that more than 50% of
all CSD partnerships are showing hardly any output related to achieving
their sustainability targets. Among them, the ﬁve most effective energy
partnerships analyzed here are real “champions.”
Inﬂuence of Internal Organization
An inductive study of the ﬁve most effective energy partnerships shows
that they have common features at the level of internal organization, which
can be seen as increasing effectiveness. While the very low level of insti-
tutionalization among the least effective partnerships is the key reason for
their dysfunctionality, the energy sector “champions” are highly institu-
tionalized and have robust organizational structures (Pattberg et al. 2009).
This helps them work toward the achievement of their goals despite the
fact that all these initiatives are much diversiﬁed (with the exception of the
Global Gas Flaring Reduction Partnership). Through our qualitative analy-
sis, two important structural features became visible in the sample of the
most effective partnerships that play a role in increasing problem-solving
capacity: management structure and the presence of executive and admin-
istrative suborgans.
Management Structure. The ﬁrst is management structure, resembling
international organizations, in which three elements are present: a general
assembly representing all the partners/members, a smaller executive
board performing regular activities, and an administrative as well as
representative secretariat that keeps the organization running. The second
feature is the presence of subbodies organized along issue areas or geo-
graphic location, allowing for the constant reception of signals from the
organization’s environment.
All of the ﬁve most effective partnerships show elements of this
structure.
1. The Methane to Markets partnership has a permanent steering com-
mittee, which is composed of the maximum of two delegates from
each of the partner states (Methane to Markets 2009). The steering
committee meets regularly, but the daily administrative activities are
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implemented by the Administrative Support Group, the partner-
ship’s secretariat. Subcommittees act both as lower level executive
organs and as focused governance organs. Subcommittees imple-
ment the partnership’s strategies in the respective sectors (coal, oil
andgas, landﬁll gas, and agriculture) and coordinate speciﬁc projects.
2. The Renewable Energy and Energy Efﬁciency Partnership main-
tains a clear task division between the permanent executive body
and the general assembly (Pattberg et al. 2009). The head of the
governing board (executive) also chairs the annual Meeting of Part-
ners. The organizational backbone of the partnership is the Inter-
national Secretariat, employing 8–10 permanent staff members. It
not only deals with the administrative and coordination issues but
also engages in lobbying activities and public relations (Moscoso-
Osterkorn 2005). The Programme Board and Finance Committee
are elements of a complex yet transparent decision-making struc-
ture, which also involves regional secretariats (with permanent
Renewable Energy and Energy Efﬁciency Partnership staff) and
focal points.
3. The Renewable Energy Policy Network for the 21st Century has a
similar structure. The steering committee in this case is the larger
assembly, while the day-to-day executive is the elected standing
bureau (Renewable Energy Policy Network for the 21st Century
2009). Again, the administrative and representative functions are
performed by the permanent secretariat, which is (as in the case of
Renewable Energy and Energy Efﬁciency Partnership) the main
carrier of the partnership’s corporate identity.
4. The International Solar Energy Society, as a transnational NGO with
a 54-year track record, has the most complex structure of the most
effective initiatives. It is, however, possible to distinguish the same
core organs as in the three initiatives already discussed. In the Inter-
national Solar Energy Society, the board of directors acts as a steering
committee, with the executive committee as permanent executive
body. The International Headquarters in Freiburg is only an alterna-
tive name for a typical secretariat. Additional bodies such as the
divisions, councils, and standing committees diversify the executive,
while regional ofﬁces and national sections act as local secretariats
and focal points for the organization.
5. Only the Global Gas Flaring Reduction partnership is coordinated by
a temporary secretariat at the World Bank. A steering committee is
currently planned (Global Gas Flaring Reduction Partnership 2009).
Overall, this supports our argument that such tripartite structure
enhances the potential effectiveness of a partnership. The secretariat is a
nodal point, which in a way “is” the organization; that is where the staff
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dedicated to its day-to-day output is employed. This implies two things:
The secretariat is the carrier of the partnership’s organizational identity
and therefore, is crucial for its effectiveness.
The other key point with regard to organizational structure is the
steering committee or board. If we analyze the names of people sitting
in the various steering committees and executive boards, we notice a
certain overlap among the energy partnerships. The most striking
example is Grifﬁn Thompson from the U.S. State Department, who sits in
the Steering Committee of the Renewable Energy Policy Network for the
21st Century, the Governing Board of the Renewable Energy and Energy
Efﬁciency Partnership, and another successful partnership, the Global
Village Energy Partnership. Piotr Tulej from the European Commission
also serves both the Renewable Energy Policy Network for the 21st
Century and the Renewable Energy and Energy Efﬁciency Partnership.
Although board members come and go, the fact that certain names
appear more than once suggests that these executive bodies are the focal
points for expertise. While secretariats guarantee visibility, operational
disposition, and “brand” continuity (they are also the driving force of
the organization similar to any bureaucracy), executive boards are nec-
essary for important decisions leading to goal attainment, partnership’s
growth, and donor credibility. In other words, partnerships that do not
adopt this basic tripartite structure are far less likely to succeed in the
long term.
Executive and Administrative Suborgans. The second decisive feature of
successful partnerships in the energy sector is the presence of executive
and administrative suborgans. Methane to Markets has a set of four sec-
toral subcommittees representing the methane producing industries,
while the Renewable Energy and Energy Efﬁciency Partnership has eight
Regional Secretariats (and corresponding regional steering committees)
and two regional focal points (Renewable Energy and Energy Efﬁciency
Partnership 2009). Both these (seemingly different) sets of organs play a
very similar role. Methane to Markets draws its relative success from the
close link with industry in speciﬁc issue areas, while the Renewable
Energy and Energy Efﬁciency Partnership, as emphasized by one of its
senior staff member, aims at a regional and local focus: “In the past a lot of
these regional consultations were really one-sided. . . . Being bottom-up
and driven by your partners in the regions has a signiﬁcant advantage in
terms of ownership by those countries.”3
The International Solar Energy Society is situated in between these two
approaches, combining a regionally and nationally focused approach with
the issue-oriented perspective. Such lower-level orientation plays an
important role in enhancing a partnership’s inﬂuence. This does not nec-
essarily show in the output but rather in the actual fulﬁllment of partner-
ship functions.
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Inﬂuence of Institutional Nesting
As a ﬁnal explanatory factor that has emerged through the qualitative
analysis is the way in which a partnership is nested in already established
institutional structures. The Global Gas Flaring Reduction partnership
stands out from the rest as its organizational structure is rooted in a
different tradition. The initiative resembles more a project on an intergov-
ernmental organization than a self-standing transnational NGO. It is
essentially a program of the World Bank, headed by a program manager.
At ﬁrst glance, the partnership is almost a twin of the LPG Challenge—
also a project of an intergovernmental organization but hosted by the
UNDP. Both are also rather narrow-in-scope sectoral initiatives. Such
degree of similarity allows for a fruitful comparison.
While the structure of LPG Challenge was unclear and there seems to
be no person responsible for the partnership’s activities (or lack thereof),
the Global Gas Flaring Reduction Partnership has a permanent staff of 10
(all World Bank employees), which is a rather high number compared to
the total set of all 340 CSD-registered partnerships. A steering committee
is to be established until that time the World Bank takes care of the
day-to-day administrative activities. While the lack of institutionalization,
staff, and resources can be an explanatory variable, it also needs explana-
tion. The LPG Challenge is a development-oriented program under the
United Nations. While energy is its main theme because it deals with
liquid petroleum gas, its goals are in fact related to the improvement of
living standards, health, and poverty alleviation (CSD 2009).
The Global Gas Flaring Reduction Partnership unites a number of very
inﬂuential and powerful partners, and its activities can have important
environmental impact precisely because it is related to one of the most
important industries globally—the oil industry. The comparison between
these two initiatives supports the “powerful actor” hypothesis about part-
nership effectiveness. With private partners such as British Petroleum,
ExxonMobil, TotalFinaElf, Statoil, Shell Petroleum, Norsk Hydro, and
Chevron Texaco, governments of the United States, Norway, the United
Kingdom, of members of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting
Countries as well as other oil exporters, and the administrative support of
the World Bank, the Global Gas Flaring Reduction Partnership seems to be
destined for success. Yet, its effectiveness raises many questions. Despite
the potential resources available, it failed to fulﬁll the most difﬁcult
function—technical implementation. More than half of its output is not
related to its functions. The Global Gas Flaring Reduction Partnership
seems to be a perfect example of the privatization of global environmental
governance (Falkner 2003; Pattberg 2005). In the lack of existing interna-
tional regulation of gas ﬂaring, private actors, and interested governments
(theNorwegiangovernment,which is themainownerof the semiprivate oil
industry companies Statoil and Norsk Hydro, stands somewhere between
public and private stakeholders in this case) decided on voluntary regula-
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tion for themselves. This can be interpreted either as a positive action and
“greening” of the oil industry or as “green window dressing,” which hides
cartel-like practices. In either case, the role of powerful public and private
actors is considerable, while the impact of internal organization is hard to
evaluate.
Conclusions
Overall, we conclude from our analysis that the involvement of powerful
actors is necessary but not sufﬁcient for an initiative’s success. As the
quantitative analysis has shown, the presence of industrialized countries,
along with that of private for-proﬁt partners, is quite strongly correlated
with output. The more in-depth qualitative analysis suggests that the inﬂu-
ential partnerships link many powerful states and businesses. By contrast,
most of the least effective partnerships include weaker and poorerAfrican
countries (African Energy Legacy Project, LPG Challenge) or small island
developing states. However, a more detailed analysis suggests that power-
ful actors alone are not a sufﬁcient condition for partnership success. First
of all, if a partnership serves as a “brand” rather thananactual organization,
it will not be effective even if it has far reaching support from the United
States (as the U.S. Clean Energy Initiative) or from inﬂuential and estab-
lished international organizations (as the International Renewable Energy
Alliance). In such cases, the powerful partners can inﬂuence apartnership’s
visibility and reputation (as for the U.S. Clean Energy Initiative), but
effectiveness as a partnership is not really the direct goal of these initiatives.
Another point emerging from the qualitative analysis is that the level of
institutionalization and the internal organizational structure of an initiative
matter. Effective partnerships have to be institutionalized into real organi-
zations. If they are, they become operational and can work toward achiev-
ing the envisaged goals. Depending on the scale of these goals, the activities
of a partnership may require more or less resources. If the aim of a
partnership is knowledge dissemination, training, or advocacy, the
resources needed are quite limited. The nongovernmental International
Solar Energy Society is able to function effectively for over ﬁve decades
without being co-opted by business actors or powerful states. The same
holds for theRenewableEnergyPolicyNetwork for the 21stCentury,which
is primarily a lobbying and advocacy network. However, the more salient
an issue area is for governments (e.g., oil or energy security), the higher are
the chances that powerful state actors will get involved. The example of the
Global Gas Flaring Reduction Partnership shows that petroleum-related
issues feature prominently on the agenda, attracting powerful actors to
“voluntary” private regulation. The case of the Renewable Energy and
Energy Efﬁciency Partnership suggests that while wealthy and powerful
donors are important for the scale of an initiative, it may actually be the
bottom-up (be it regional or issue-oriented) approach that explains the
inﬂuence a partnership can have and the impact it potentially could make.
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The decision-making styles and the governance culture might also play
a role but only in the context of a functional partnership. If a partnership
is operational and well institutionalized in the form of an organization
with functional forums of decision making, then (and only then) can the
factor of deliberation make a difference. Hence, the main policy conclu-
sion of this article is that a partnership, in order to be effective, needs to be
institutionalized, preferably in the form of an organization with an execu-
tive board that should include the representatives of major stakeholders
and a permanent administrative secretariat dedicated to the goal and
mission of the initiative. The involvement of powerful actors can help by
bringing in necessary resources and is crucial in the case of large-scale
partnerships established to perform difﬁcult and costly activities.
Our analysis has also shown the adequacy of an approach that com-
bines quantitative and qualitative methods to assess the effectiveness of
multi-stakeholder partnerships. We have proposed to approach the ques-
tion of effectiveness by analyzing the concrete output of partnerships,
using its ﬁt with the partnerships’ function as a proxy for potential effec-
tiveness. Future research should engage further with the challenging
question of how to gather comparative data on partnership outcome
(behavioral change) and partnership impact (problem solving).
Finally, we come back to the central question that underlies much of the
current sustainability discourse: Are partnerships a major innovation in
global governance for sustainable development or rather old wine in new
bottles? First, our ﬁnding that a partnership should be institutionalized to
be functional may seem trivial, but in the context of over 300 CSD part-
nerships, it clearly is not. As we have shown, some partnerships are
purposefully left as hollow, noninstitutionalized “brands,” while others
simply do not have the necessary resources to support a standing admin-
istration. Hence, the ﬁndings of this article directly challenge claims that
partnerships are a positive institutional innovation established to reach the
goals of sustainable development. While their broad and general goals are
widely accepted, it seems that many partnerships do not offer concrete
steps toward achieving international commitments and remain mostly at
the level of political rhetoric (cf. Biermann, Pattberg, et al. 2007).
Only a minority of partnerships is operational and has visible signs of
output, which normally correlates with a certain degree of institutional-
ization and organizational form. The examples of relatively effective part-
nerships that we investigated show that this organizational form often
hardly differs from the standard structure of intergovernmental organiza-
tions. Partnerships are regarded as institutional innovations only because
they take the form of private–public governance schemes. However, the
example of the International Solar Energy Society suggests that as far as
NGOs and epistemic communities are concerned, the “private” sector has
already been included in such initiatives for some time. Only direct
involvement of business actors seems to be new, but then the question is
if this form of “innovation” is, in all cases, necessarily positive.
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One argument in support of the claim that partnerships improve global
governance is that their permanent secretariats—the administrative
bureaucratic cores—are usually quite efﬁcient. They employ few profes-
sionals who are meticulously monitored by the donors. This helps to save
ﬁnancial resources for other activities than just running the organization.
This is an often-mentioned weakness of traditional intergovernmental
organizations. In this sense, the closer cooperationwith business actors and
the diffusion of modern corporate management patterns are indeed a
positive innovation.
However, within the overall community of partnerships, where numer-
ous actors are involved in similar activities, we can also observe substan-
tial “turf wars.” It is quite clear that numerous partnerships with a larger
scope are doubling their functions and efforts to some extent. The British
and Norwegian governments lead Renewable Energy and Energy Efﬁ-
ciency Partnership, the Italian Mediterranean Renewable Energy Program,
the German Renewable Energy Policy Network for the 21st Century, the
French Agence de l’Environnement et de la Maîtrise de l’Energie, and the
U.S. Global Village Energy Partnership—all partnerships in the general
area of “renewable energy” are a good example. Sometimes this leads to
cooperation; on other occasions, potential areas of intervention are demar-
cated along the lines of older “aid regimes” often of colonial origin.
However, resources can also be wasted this way, and this is a conclusion
supporting the establishment of an overarching regulatory body in
the sustainable development and environmental governance sector
(Biermann 2000).
In sum, based on our assessment of sustainable energy partnerships in
the sample of CSD multi-stakeholder partnerships, the positive expecta-
tions that were placed on multi-stakeholder partnerships by both govern-
ments and civil society organizations have hardly been met. If inactive
partnerships were erased from the CSD database by the United Nations
Department of Economic and Social Affairs, the number of partnerships
would most likely be halved. However, the political myth of multi-
stakeholder partnerships is still alive. Partnerships that are nonoperational
remain in the CSD database and can even become partners of other part-
nerships (as happened with the Paciﬁc Islands Energy for Sustainable
Development partnership and Renewable Energy and Energy Efﬁciency
Partnership). This critique may seem unfair to those partnerships that are
doing their best to fulﬁll their goals. However, even when considering
success cases such as Renewable Energy and Energy Efﬁciency Partner-
ship, the promise of effective, fair, and equitable global governance
through multi-stakeholder partnerships is quite exaggerated.
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Notes
1. The Global Sustainability Partnerships Database (GSPD) was developed
between 2006 and 2009 at the Institute for Environmental Studies, VU Uni-
versity Amsterdam. Based on data provided by the CSD Partnership Data-
base, extensive desk studies, and more than 150 expert interviews, the
database provides information on descriptive categories such as number and
type of leadpartners, area of policy implementation, and functionperformed.
In addition, theGSPDalso contains information about individual partnership
output, that is, the concrete activities and programs of multi-stakeholder
partnerships. All data were coded by a team of researchers for whom an
inter-rater reliability check has been performed. For more details on the data
categories used, see Biermann, Chan, et al. (2007), Biermann, Pattberg, et al.
(2007), Biermann et al. (Forthcoming), and Pattberg et al. (Forthcoming).
2. For the purpose of this analysis, the level of institutionalization is under-
stood as a combination of “institutional” variables coded in the GSPD (staff,
ofﬁce, own budget, and logo) as well as the results of a qualitative assess-
ment of the 10 partnerships analyzed. This included an evaluation of the
relationship between the partnership and the founding partners (i.e., is the
partnership institutionalized as a separate organization or is it only a project
ran within the existing structures of a larger entity?), corporate identity, and
the legal basis on which the partnership operates.
3. Interview with Renewable Energy and Energy Efﬁciency Partnership staff
member, April 2008, Vienna.
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